Cost and Pricing
There has been a lot of discussion on the several websites lately about the fact that Amazon has priced their Kindle Fire below cost. This revelation came in the aftermath of a study done by IHS iSuppli which provided a breakout of the costs as follows:
That is the total cost to Amazon (ticker symbol AMZ) is $209.63, however, the Amazon Kindle Fire is currently selling for $199. You wouldn’t be the only one double-checking the simple math here; they are taking an operating loss on the sale of the Kindle Fire of $10.63 per unit (not including taxes). How can this be sustainable?
The short answer is it’s not. Or, put more precisely, it’s a red herring for where profit really comes from on these type of devices. Many management blogs have talked about pricing for market share and the pros and cons of skim pricing strategies (pricing a product so high it limits the market to only those who really want the product and creates a sense of value in and of itself) and penetration pricing (pricing set low enough, sometimes below cost, to obtain market share). Ironically the Kindle 2 and Kindle DX were originally priced for $349 and $499, respectively. That is Amazon recognized the need to make a profit on the physical units themselves. However sales were less than stellar which led to the much lower priced Kindle Fire under what is perceived as a penetration pricing model.
But the ideas of penetration pricing only get part of the story right. Well, actually it might be much less than half the story. Content is the bigger story here. When interviewed about the IHS iSuppli study Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon, said “We want the hardware device to be profitable and the content to be profitable. We really don’t want to subsidize on with the other.” But they are, at least for now.
This reflects the technical relationship between price and cost that everyone learned in Microeconomics 101 – you price to maximize profits, which is where marginal cost and marginal revenue cross. That is pricing the Kindle Fire below cost is unsustainable. However, as Mr. Bezos implied, content and in Amazon’s case the connection to its overall available goods online, is the moneymaker. Amazon has also proven to be a bit of a model-buster – they lose money on shipping; that is they don’t charge enough to cover their shipping costs.
When the expected sales of digital content are added to the sales price Amazon is expected to make a net profit of $10 per unit.
The Apples to Apples Comparison
Let’s look at Apple for an interesting comparison. Apple sells both the iPod and the iPhone. Comparing the two offers an interesting contrast in how much content can play a role from the physical devices that deliver that content. In addition to the iPod itself is also its connection to content – the iTunes Store. Their iPhone, although they receive kickbacks from wireless content providers, does not have such a direct connection for Apple since they don’t provide the wireless service as well (the bulk of that has been AT&T exclusively until recently). Net sales per unit sold of iPods was about $175 in 2011; however when adding in net sales from music and other iPod related items that grew to $323. Net sales per unit sold of iPhones (including related products and services) was about $651. Net sales per unit sold of iPads (again including related products and services) was about $628. That is Apple is making a very nice margin on both their physical products and content related to those products.
Where Will The Revenue Come From?
Amazon’s margins for their Kindle Fire, at $10 per unit, are going to likely be much lower. Unfortunately there is no hard data yet on the exact number of Kindle Fire units sold nor their net sales. However, what’s making Amazon’s bet different is that they hope to make large profits by: 1) consumers purchasing content (books, magazines, etc. that they read using the Kindle Fire), and 2) linking the purchase of other products (that might have higher margins) through the Kindle Fire.
On the first point just look at what Apple is doing with the iPod; net sales per iPod nearly double once you add in things like the iTunes store. AT&T, who until recently was the sole provider of data for the iPhone until recently, has seen revenues from data jump from about 20% of revenues in 2007 to around 39% in 2011. What is also interesting to note is that despite losses of customers due to the recent price increases by AT&T for data streaming, they are likely holding on to many more. Their least expensive package will go from $15 to $20 per month and the vast majority of customers have stuck around. That is customers who want the iPhone are pretty price inelastic in this price range for downloading data to the device and see $20 as still a good value.
The second point is made clearer in the following graphic which is research showing the number of people that expect to make purchases on-line with Amazon jumping not coincidentally with the introduction of sales of the Kindle Fire (November 2011 shipments started):
How these available technologies prove profitable could change the way we look at pricing forever. Generally penetration pricing for a business is unsustainable and is an attempt at short-term market share. It’s a gamble, even for Amazon. But the devil’s in the details. Overall, businesses should be asking themselves what is truly driving revenue for their company, particularly if they are being impacted by these same technologies, and how do they leverage their relationship with their customers?
How does your business view pricing in 2012?



















